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There is a view today that “this time it’s different” for emerging markets.  
Governments are reducing their dependence on external debt and relying more on 
domestic debt financing for the first time!  Furthermore, emerging market governments 
are increasingly issuing long-term domestic debt.  Indeed, often this change in 
government debt management patterns is taken as evidence of graduation from “serial 
default.”  In this new world, debt crises in emerging markets will be a thing of the past, 
and the IMF is plainly out of business.2 
Domestic debt is not a new invention 
Yet, alas, apparently unknown to most observers in financial, academic, and 
policy circles, domestic debt has been around for a quite a while.  For that matter, so too 
has been default on domestic debt of one form or another.  In our latest paper, Kenneth 
Rogoff and I unearth a vast trove of historical time series data on external and domestic 
public debt for 64 countries ranging back to 1914.  Our key sources are publications of 
the now-defunct League of Nations, updates by its successor, the United Nations, and the 
work of many scholars and government agencies. 
                                                 
1 This article is based on Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff’s (2008) “The Forgotten History of 
Domestic Debt.” NBER Working Paper 13946, April (2008). 
2 Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano (2003). “Debt Intolerance,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 1–74, document cases of “serial default,” that is cases where 
governments have repeatedly defaulted or restructured their debts (including publicly-guaranteed debts); 
Venezuela with 9 defaults since independence holds the record among today’s emerging markets. 
Although it may come as quite a surprise to most readers that historical time 
series on domestic debt should be exotic for so many countries, it is. This is in contrast to 
external sovereign debt, on which there is a vast literature.  We are not aware of any 
academic or policy study that uses similar data, certainly not one encompassing such a 
long time period and so many countries. 
Indeed, historical data on domestic (internal) government debt has been ignored 
for so long that many observers have come to believe that the recent rise in domestic debt 
in many emerging markets is novel.  This perspective is based on the belief that, 
historically, domestic government debt played only a minor role in the public finances of 
most developing countries.  The new data thoroughly dispels this notion.  The key 
findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) are summarized in the remainder of this article. 
First, domestic debt is and was large—for the 64 countries for which we have 
long time series, domestic debt averages almost two-thirds of total public debt; the 
increase in the share of domestic debt in the last few years is but an upward “blip” in the 
larger context.  For most of the sample, these debts typically carried a market interest 
rate, except for the era of financial repression after World War II.  From 1914 through 
the 1960s, before inflation became a widespread phenomenon, more than one-half of 
domestic debt was long term, even for Latin America. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Domestic  Public Debt as a Share of Total Debt, 
1900-2006
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The puzzle of “debt intolerance” 
Recognizing the significance of domestic debt goes a long way toward 
explaining the puzzle of why many countries default on (or restructure) their external 
debts at seemingly low debt thresholds.  In fact, when heretofore ignored domestic debt 
obligations are taken into account (as shown in Figure 2), fiscal duress at the time of 
default is often revealed to be considerably more severe.3  Specifically, debt-to-revenue 
ratios are about twice as high for total (domestic plus external) debt as the standard ratios 
that only considered external indebtedness. 
                                                 
3 This puzzling “debt intolerance” is examined by Reinhart,  Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). 
 Default through inflation 
Domestic debt may also explain the paradox of why some governments seem to 
choose inflation rates far above any level that might be rationalized by seignorage 
revenues levered off the monetary base. (This was the puzzle first pointed out in Cagan’s 
classic, 1956, article on post-war hyperinflations.)4  Although domestic debt is largely 
ignored in the vast empirical literature on high and hyper-inflation, we find that there are 
many cases where the hidden overhang of domestic public debt was at least the same 
order of magnitude as base money, and more often than not, a large multiple, as shown in 
Figure 3..   
                                                 
4 Cagan, Philip (1956). “The Money Dynamics of Hyperinflation.”  In Milton Friedman (ed.), Studies in 
the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
 
Figure 2. Public Debt-to-Revenue Ratios During External  
Default: 89 Episodes, 1827-2003
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Domestic Debt and Monetary Base During High Inflation
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Outright defaults on domestic debt 
Where there are domestic debts there is also domestic default.  Our paper offers 
a first attempt to catalogue episodes of outright defaults on and reschedulings of domestic 
public debt across more than a century.  This phenomenon appears to be somewhat rarer 
than external default, but far too common to justify the extreme assumption that 
governments always honor the nominal face value of domestic debt.  When outright 
default on domestic debt does occur, it appears to occur under situations of greater 
duress than for pure external defaults—both in terms of an implosion of output and 
marked escalation of inflation.  As shown in Figure 4, in the runup to a default on 
external debt, the economy is stagnant or in recession (on average, real per capita GDP 
edges down slightly from its level four years before the crisis); on the eve of domestic 
default, however, the output contraction is much deeper, as GDP registers an average 
decline of about 8 percent.  
It is important to note that we do not here catalogue episodes of major de facto 
partial defaults, say through a sharp unexpected increase in financial repression (e.g., of 
the type China still imposes today). 
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Reflections on future prospects 
Celebration about graduating from a history of serial default may be premature.  This 
author is skeptical that proposed remedies to the syndrome of serial default, such as 
contingent debt contracts (for example, see those discussed by Guimaraes) will 
significantly lessen the likelihood of sovereign default or restructuring. 5  One variety of a 
state-contingent contract is inflation-indexed debt.  At the time of this writing, Argentina 
is engineering a partial default on its domestic debt by significantly understating the 
domestic inflation rate (reported at about 8 percent) to which the debt is indexed.  
Unofficial estimates of inflation are in the order of 25 to 30 percent.6  
Governments that have repeatedly defaulted on their external debts, inflated away 
or outright defaulted their domestic debts, will, in all likelihood, not hesitate to default 
again. 
 
                                                 
5 See Bernardo Guimaraes “Emerging economies’ debt contingent on world real interest rates,” VoxEU 
October 8, 2007.  
6  For instance, see the story reported by the news agency Bloomberg on January 23, 2008.  It led off, 
“Argentina's real inflation rate in 2007 was almost three times the official figure as a result of data 
manipulation, the union representing the National Statistics Institute's workers said in a report.” 
 
